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1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
1.1  Speaking at Trinity College Dublin on February 13th 2008, Scotland’s First 
Minister, Alex Salmond, called for Scottish policy makers to study and extract 
lessons from the remarkable growth of the Irish economy from 1993. The 
purpose of this report is to provide a comparative study of one area of public 
policy which hitherto has attracted much speculation but little serious analysis; 
that of diaspora and diaspora strategy. 
    
1.2.  In both Scotland and Ireland sustained attention is now being given to the 
potential benefits which might flow from renewing and refreshing relationships 
with overseas diasporic populations. This has manifested itself in a raft of 
diaspora related policy initiatives. In neither case, however, is a formal and 
systematic diaspora engagement yet in place. The objective of the report is to 
contribute to the development of such a strategy by identifying and reflecting 
upon Scotland’s approach to its diaspora relative to its Irish counterpart . 
    
1.3 The report uses the term ‘strategy’ in a loose way to refer to firstly the securing of 
an overview of the range of actual and potential public, private, and voluntary ties 
between diasporic groups and Scotland,  and secondly the development of a 
preferred orientation as to how these ties might best be developed. ‘Strategy’ in 
this context need not imply, and may not be best served by, a coherent and 
formalised top down, bureaucratically regulated, and managerialist, blueprint.  
    
1.4  This project did not seek to evaluate any specific aspect of Scottish or Irish 
diaspora policy and we have undertaken no such task.  Rather, we offer a series 
of observations which are informed by international comparisons, conversations 
with key actors from both the Scottish and Irish Governments, and an analysis of 
official documents and policy statements.   
 
1.5 It is clear that a whole number of initiatives already underway will play an 
important role in Scotland’s diaspora engagement. Scotland has already made 
significant progress in connecting with its diaspora and has been cited by the 
World Bank as an exemplar of best practice in the area of business networks. 
Current initiatives include but are not limited to:  
 
Global Scot – a business network connecting highly skilled Scots around the           
world. 
Global Friends of Scotland – a social and community network linking overseas 
Scots.   
Homecoming 2009 – a flagship campaign seeking to encourage tourist visits 
and perhaps a longer term relationship between Scotland and its diaspora. 
Tartan Day and Scotland Week – An official day set aside in the United States 
(and other countries) to celebrate the heritage and legacy of Scottish emigrants; 
Scotland Week is held alongside this to promote links with Scotland.   
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The central web portal Scotland.org – An official gateway to Scotland serving 
as a one stop shop for a variety of user groups. 
Creative Scotland – an organisation that once established will be dedicated to 
promoting Scottish culture and arts both at home and abroad. 
Fresh Talent Initiative and Talent Scotland – Agencies such as the Relocation 
Advisory Service established to promote skilled migration, including return 
migration, to Scotland.  
AncestralScotland.com website and ScotlandsPeople Resources – The 
former a Visit Scotland tourist promotion web site, the latter a government 
backed partnership between the General Register Office for Scotland, the 
National Archives of Scotland and The Court of the Lord Lyon, including a 
website and the new Scotland’s People Centre in Edinburgh, which is a resource 
for ancestral visitors seeking genealogical research materials. 
The Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies at Edinburgh University – A new 
research centre serving as a focal point for research on the Scottish diaspora.  
   
1.6   The intention of the report is to concentrate minds around five critical questions 
which if addressed could go some way to providing a clearer shape to Scotland’s 
approach to its diaspora.  
1.7 Which populations constitute the Scottish diaspora and should be included as 
part of a targeted diaspora strategy? 
 For pragmatic and political reasons there is an urgent need to define and 
delineate the range of constituencies which might constitute the Scottish 
diaspora. There is merit in widening the definition of diaspora to include as many 
constituencies who might be prepared to play for ‘Team Scotland’ as possible. 
This widening might include expatriates irrespective of the grounds for their 
departure, later day descendants with a sense of heritage, mobile Scots and 
business travellers leading a transnational existence, and other nationalities both 
resident in Scotland and elsewhere with an affinity towards the country. 
1.8 What government structures and programmes are best suited to the 
establishment of new relations with diasporic populations? 
The Irish approach to its diaspora is relatively successful, particularly with 
respect to business, because it is light and flexible in structure, gives ownership 
and freedom to its members, and is developmental without being muscular.  The 
state’s role is to nurture and incubate, not manage and over-determine.  
Scotland, in contrast, has pursued a strategy that is more muscular, state-centric 
and centrally managed.  If it is true to say that the Scottish diaspora is less well 
articulated and organised, then there might be good reason for this. The Scottish 
Government might usefully reflect on the position and role of the state in 
managing diaspora initiatives, conduct research into already existing diaspora 
networks, and consider complimenting existing state run schemes by seeding, 
serving as midwife, and performing a husbandary role for wider social and 
economic networks amongst the Scottish diaspora.  In addition, public 
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administration of diaspora schemes should consider creating a specific set of 
measurable deliverables suitable to the task and timeframe at hand.   
1.9 How are diaspora organized and how does their underlying structure and logic 
predispose them to engage in different ways with the home nation? 
The Scottish diaspora is almost as expansive and large as the Irish diaspora and 
is a huge and relatively untapped resource for Scotland. Nevertheless, as a 
consequence of the historical formation of the diaspora, and in particular the 
voluntary nature of much of the emigration and speed of assimilation into the new 
communities, it is widely believed that it is not as well organized or culturally 
ready to be engaged.  Fundamental to the building of a Scottish diaspora 
strategy must be a renewed interest in fortifying and stimulating Scottish-
mindedness in the diaspora.  It is clear that a critical mass of high profile culture 
building projects is now being constructed and these will surely make a 
significant contribution to the building of the diaspora.  
1.10 What social, economic, and demographic objectives ought to underpin the 
engagement with diasporic populations? 
Scotland has different social, cultural, and economic needs from Ireland and has 
a different set of rationales for engaging with its diaspora. In Ireland, the use of 
the income from the Celtic Tiger period to support vulnerable groups overseas, 
the building of business networks to lubricate the globalization of Irish firms 
and the localization of Trans National Companies (TNCs) in Ireland, and the 
preservation of an elevated sense of diasporic patriotism at a time of change are 
critical objectives. Return migration to meet population growth targets, the 
establishment of global economic networks to broker the globalization of Scottish 
firms and the localization of TNCs in Scotland, as well as the cultural nurturing of 
a comparatively weaker Scottish diaspora are all key and pressing priorities for 
Scotland.   
1.11 What concrete policies and interventions are current being introduced and what 
innovations merit closer scrutiny? 
Scottish policy makers should look in particular at the possibilities of reworking 
the following Irish schemes into a Scottish diaspora strategy. 
 
Irish Abroad Unit 
Emigrant Advice Network 
Enterprise Ireland’s approach to building business and social networks  
Emigrant News Online 
Ireland Funds 
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They should also consider building a larger version of Scottish Networks 
International and helping to nurture (though not own and run) ventures such as 
Scots in London network. 
 
1.12 Ireland should in turn study and draw lessons from : 
 
Globalscot 
Scottish Network International 
Fresh Talent Initiative which includes the Relocation Advisory Service  
Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies  
Scotland.org Web portal 
Homecoming Scotland 2009 campaign 
 
1.13 Clearly, the current global economic downturn will have ramifications for diaspora 
policy, affecting remittance transfers, philanthropy, the extension of welfare 
entitlements, migration patterns, tourist flows, and the functioning of economic 
networks. Nevertheless there is an argument to be made that it is precisely in this 
context that diaspora groups have an even greater role to play in promoting 
national social, cultural, and economic development. 
 
1.14 Scotland and Ireland have much to learn from each other with regards to how 
they conceive and develop their relationship with their respective diasporas.  The 
Scottish diaspora represents a huge potential resource for Scotland, and 
Scotland offers the diaspora many benefits; the key is to develop a strong 
partnership between both which is mutually beneficial.  Our view is that any 
strategy for Scotland should: 
 
• seek to focus on the cultural as well as the economic;  
• be light in touch and flexible where appropriate rather than heavily structured 
and over-determined;  
• be formulated to work over the long term;  
• have an open view of who constitutes the diaspora and the value of an affinity 
diaspora;  
• recognize that the intangible benefits of a strategy will be as important as 
tangible ones; 
• understand that the relationship with the diaspora has to be reciprocal for it to 
be sustainable.   
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2. INTRODUCTION  
 
2.1 For some time, commentators from each of the main political parties in Scotland 
have deliberated over the lessons which might be learned from the remarkable 
growth of the Irish economy from 19931. Attention has been given to areas of 
commonality and difference and debate has centered on the extent to which Irish 
economic policy might provide pointers for Scottish economy policy. Speaking at 
Trinity College Dublin on February 13th 2008, Scotland’s First Minister, Alex 
Salmond, reasserted the significance of the Irish comparison and pointed to the 
continuing inspiration Ireland provides when envisioning Scotland’s future:    
 
2.2 ‘As a nation, Scotland must look outwards and upwards. We must measure 
ourselves against those around us - and those who have the ambition to achieve. 
Scotland looks out to an Arc of Prosperity around us. Ireland, Iceland, Norway, 
Finland and Denmark. All small independent nations. All stable, secure and 
prosperous. Of all these nations, no example is more impressive and inspiring 
than Ireland. And none is more relevant to the decisions that Scotland faces 
today. So I have come to Dublin to set out our aspirations for Scotland's future - 
how we will create a Celtic Lion economy to match the Celtic Tiger on this side of 
the Irish Sea….The rewards to a nation that is willing to face up to its position, 
set its ambition, and pursue it resolutely - these rewards could scarcely be 
greater. The story of Ireland - one of the greatest success stories of the last 
century, and of this century - is a testament to what the people of Scotland can 
achieve.’ 
2.3 Given that both countries have different demographic, cultural, constitutional, 
political, social, economic, and institutional histories, it is clear that what 
happened in Ireland is not transferable to Scotland, at least in any straightforward 
manner. Discussion around ‘best practice’ and ‘policy transfer’ needs to be 
undergirded by a careful analysis of the specificities of the Scottish and Irish 
economies, in areas such as demographic trends, labour market intervention, 
enterprise and innovation, foreign direct investment, infrastructure and utilities. 
The purpose of this report is to provide a comparative study of one area of public 
policy which hitherto has attracted much speculation but little serious analysis; 
that of diaspora and diaspora strategy. 
2.4 In both Scotland and Ireland sustained attention is now being given to the 
potential benefits which might flow from renewing and refreshing relationships 
with overseas diasporic populations. This has manifested itself in a raft of 
diaspora related policy initiatives. In neither case, however, is a formal and 
systematic diaspora strategy yet in place. This perhaps is fortunate as our 
findings suggest that the imposition of an overarching, rigid and highly formalised 
diaspora strategy or framework may prove largely ineffective over the long term; 
                                                 
1 see Alexander (2003), and Coyle, Alexander, and Ashcroft (2005) for a more systematic assessment of 
the possibilities  
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indeed one of our conclusions is to suggest that a lightness of touch will be a key 
element in fostering successful relationships between nations and their diaspora.  
Alan Gamlen2 refers to this approach as ‘tactics without strategy’. As such, there 
is scope for the Scottish Government to adopt a more strategic orientation 
towards the Scottish diaspora without this orientation being overly-determined.  
The objective of the report is to contribute to the development of such a strategic 
orientation by identifying and reflecting upon Scotland’s approach to its diaspora 
relative to its Irish counterpart3. 
2.5 The intention of the report is to concentrate minds around five critical questions 
which if addressed could go some way to providing a clearer shape to Scotland’s 
approach to its diaspora. These questions are:   
• Which populations might fall under the diaspora label and as such be 
included as part of a targeted diaspora strategy? 
• What government structures and programmes are best suited to the 
establishment of new relations with diasporic populations? 
• How are diaspora organized and how does their underlying structure and 
logic predispose them to engage in different ways with the home nation? 
• What social, economic, and demographic objectives ought to underpin the 
extensions of relations with diasporic populations? 
• What concrete policies and interventions are currently being introduced and 
what innovations merit closer scrutiny? 
2.6 Our approach has been to chart current thinking and practice in Scotland in 
regard to each question whilst at the same time drawing parallels from the Irish 
experience and enquiring into the relevance of the Irish case for Scotland. 
2.7 It is important to be clear from the outset that our aim is to stimulate thinking and 
debate about the ways in which Scotland might most productively mobilize and 
engage its diaspora in future.  Our project did NOT seek to evaluate any specific 
aspect of Scottish or Irish diaspora policy and we have undertaken no such task.  
Rather, we offer a series of observations which are informed by international 
comparisons, conversations with key actors from both the Scottish and Irish 
Governments (Appendix 1), and an analysis of official documents and policy 
statements, but which are not empirically grounded through a rigorous root and 
branch evaluation of particular schemes.  This report then is designed primarily 
as a thought piece or catalyst for further roundtable discussion and we conclude 
by proposing a series of points of debate which may prove fruitful in advancing 
and focusing policy formulation.  
                                                 
2 See Gamlen (2007) 
3 This report follows on from the Scottish Enterprise workshop ‘Engaging Scotland’s Diaspora’ held in 
Glasgow in October 2007 and notes the excellent contribution of Eirich and McLaren (2007). It also 
follows from a report written by the authors on the Irish strategy – see Boyle and Kitchin (2007) 
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2.8 The report is structured around six main sections. In the first section the bases 
and terms of reference of the comparative approach are further clarified. 
Sections 2 to 6 then work systematically through each question in turn, vis-à-vis:  
• the definition of diaspora and identification of specific diasporic populations 
for inclusion in any strategy;  
• the approaches which are best suited to engaging diasporic populations (in 
this case the constitutional status of both governments and the administration 
and operationalisation of diaspora projects); 
•  the a priori inclination of each diaspora to be engaged (the scale and 
geography of the Scottish and Irish diasporas and the strength of patriotism 
and cultural inclination to connect with the homeland);  
• the social, economic and demographic imperatives which might motivate 
further intervention;  
• and finally the detailed and concrete policy interventions which are being 
pursued in Ireland and Scotland, paying particular attention to the growing 
economic importance of diaspora knowledge networks.  
2.9 The final section concludes by setting out the key points which might merit further 
consideration and debate if Scotland is to develop a more coherent vista on its 
relations with its diaspora.    
2.10 Prior to departure, it would be remiss not to set the study into the context of the 
transformations which have occurred in the world economy in the past months 
and the movement of both the Scottish and Irish economies into recession. It is 
now estimated that the Irish economy will contract by approximately -4% in the 
next twelve months whilst the Scottish economy is projected to decline between - 
0.4 and -1.9%4. Clearly, the changing economic circumstances will have 
ramifications for diaspora policy, affecting as it will remittance transfers, 
philanthropy, the extension of welfare entitlements, migration patterns, tourist 
flows and the functioning of economic networks. But it is not all bad. Indeed, 
according to at least one influential commentator in Ireland, it may be that 
diaspora groups have an even greater role to play in promoting national 
economic development in the present climate5. It is evident that further research 
into the specific consequences of the contemporary world economic recession 
for diaspora policy is required but such a task is beyond the remit of this 
particular report. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Goudie (2008) and ESRI (2008) 
5 McWilliams (2007) 
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3. THE VALUE OF THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH  
 
3.1 At his address at Trinity College in Dublin on February 13th 2008, Scotland’s First 
Minister, Alex Salmond, sought to identify ten lessons – ‘the main inspirations’ – 
that Scotland might draw from the remarkable growth of the Irish economy from 
the early 1990s. These lessons referred to constitutional matters as well as 
social, economic, and cultural strategies:  
1. There are no limits to the success of a nation united by a common purpose 
and a clarity of will and purpose.   
2. Political independence in itself does not guarantee success: it is what you do 
with that independence which matters. 
3. While only Ireland has recent experience of independence, both countries 
‘can agree’ that continued membership of the United Kingdom ‘guarantees 
underperformance’. 
4. Investment in human capital – the education, skills and potential of our people 
– is the basic determinant of economic success. 
5. The European Union is and will remain Scotland and Ireland’s most 
significant economic relationship. 
6. Prosperity depends on openness and the development of comparative 
advantage. 
7. An economic windfall must be used wisely; economic gains need to be 
reinvested heavily in education and training, and strengthening the business 
environment to attract mobile capital. 
8. Economic growth creates its own challenges. Fast growth is not a panacea – 
though vitally, it creates the potential for the whole of society to enjoy 
prosperity. 
9. Small, peaceful countries can exercise major global influence, not on the 
bases of military power and alliances, but on values and ideals. 
10.  There is no blueprint for the transition to full independence.  Constitutional 
incrementalism is not always the best approach. 
 
3.2 Whilst not making it into his ten critical lessons, First Minister Salmond then 
progressed to a reflection upon the similarities which exist between the Scottish 
and Irish diasporas:  
‘The similarities between Scotland and Ireland are striking. Look abroad and it is 
almost a mirror image. Because for the people of two small Atlantic nations, the 
Scots and the Irish have left broad and unmistakable tracks across much of the 
world. And not only are the Scots and Irish welcomed across the globe – the 
affection and admiration runs deeper. So deep that tens of millions of citizens – in 
the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand 
– are proud to trace back their ancestry to our two great nations. Across the world, 
over 80 million people – more than one in every hundred – lays claim to being 
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Irish. And 45 million regard themselves as Scots. The size and impact of both the 
Scottish and Irish Diasporas is truly astonishing.’ (Alex Salmond, Trinity College 
Dublin, Feb 13th 2008)   
3.3 This comparison is one which is frequently commented upon. As diaspora policy 
emerges as an important public policy matter, more focused dialogue between 
Scotland and Ireland on diaspora and diaspora strategy seems inevitable. But 
why might this specific comparison be valuable? Why might this particular area of 
public policy merit a place in the wider dialogue which is taking place between 
Scotland and Ireland’s past, current status, and future trajectories? 
3.4 Diasporic populations have long played a significant role in the economic, 
political, social, and cultural life of their home nations. Historically, remittance 
receipts in particular have served a critical role in maintaining domestic 
economies which otherwise would have further stagnated. From the beginning of 
the Second World War however, governments from home countries have taken a 
more proactive stance and sought to engage diasporic groups to particular ends. 
Three subsequent waves of diaspora policy can be identified, each overlapping 
today6.  
• Firstly, from 1945 and guided by the United Nations, developing countries 
sought to send to universities in the west and then repatriate undergraduate 
and postgraduate students, in particular medical and engineering students. 
These returnees were called upon to put their learning to the service of the 
economic and social welfare of their countries.  
• Secondly, from the late 1960s onwards peripheral economies within the 
developed world began to develop an interest in out migration, now conceived 
off as constituting a brain drain. Stemming out migration and fostering a 
return of diasporic talent (brain incubation or brain circulation) emerged as a 
key policy concern.   
• Thirdly, from the 1990s onwards both peripheral and core regions within the 
developed world began to reconceive of the potential offered by diasporic 
groups from afar. The hope that significant return migration would occur was 
ill founded and in any event diasporic groups might be better engaged in situ. 
In the global economy of today, it has come to be appreciated that global 
networks and ties can be useful for enhancing national competitiveness.   
3.5 Whilst comprising a wider set of objectives, the Scottish and Irish comparison 
needs to be set against this backdrop. The World Bank has emerged as a key 
advocate of third wave diaspora strategies and has sought to promote policy 
debate, learning, and transfer in the area of diaspora policy. In so doing it has 
developed a typology of ‘country potential’ based upon the state of readiness of 
the home nations (politically, culturally, infrastructurally, etc) to engage overseas 
populations and the fitness of purpose of diasporic groups (scale, degree of 
                                                 
6 Larner (2006) 
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organisation, level of patriotism, etc) to be mobilised by their home nations (see 
Table 1)7.  Whilst this framework is clearly over simplified and provides only a 
crude categorisation of diaspora policy in particular countries, it is interesting to 
note that Scotland and Ireland are both ascribed the highest degree of country 
potential. At least according to the World Bank, a comparison of both country’s 
diaspora policies might be fruitful as each is well positioned to engage their 
respective diaspora and each has a relatively large, well organised, and 
committed diaspora.    
 
Table 1 – Country potential for diaspora strategy 
 Unfavourable Country Conditions 
Moderate Country 
Conditions 
Favourable Country 
Conditions 
Sophisticated 
Diaspora Networks 
Armenia, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka 
El Salvador, India, 
Vietnam 
China, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Ireland, 
Scotland 
Emerging diaspora 
networks 
Colombia, Nigeria, 
Russian Federation, 
Ukraine 
Brazil, Mexico, 
Pakistan, South 
Africa, Transition 
economies 
Croatia, Chile, 
Hungary, Slovenia, 
Malaysia, Thailand 
3.6 This comparison seems all the more appropriate given that both Ireland and 
Scotland are moving to redefine their relationships with their respective diaspora. 
From the turn of the century and stimulated in part by falling rates of fertility and 
fears of skills shortages in key sectors of the Scottish economy, the Scottish 
Executive began to think more formally about the relationships it might build with 
Scottish expatriate communities. In April 2008, following publication of its national 
economic strategy, the Scottish Government published its International 
Framework establishing the methodology through which it was to coordinate its 
international engagement and identifying the Scottish diaspora as a new ‘key 
priority’. The flagship event Homecoming 2009, inviting Scots to return to 
Scotland for a holiday or perhaps more permanently, has served to galvanise 
resolve to further harness the energies, knowledge, talents, and good will of the 
Scottish diaspora. According to the International Framework document:  
‘Scotland's Diaspora population around the world and across other parts of the UK 
consists of large numbers of people with a good will towards Scotland, who have 
the potential to improve our reputation and drive economic growth by acting as 
ambassadors for Scotland. We continue to work with Global Scots and our Global 
Friends of Scotland to put in place mutually beneficial relationships and to 
understand how Scotland and the Diaspora can work together to develop mutually 
beneficial partnerships. The year of Homecoming in 2009 will be a real focus for 
                                                 
7 Kutznetsov (2006) 
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energising and engaging our Diaspora, and we will ensure it has a lasting legacy 
in terms of better, more effective and higher impact communication with Scotland's 
Diaspora.’ 
’ 
3.7 Likewise as early as 1995, then Irish President Mary Robinson in an Address to 
the Houses of the Oireachtas, spoke about the importance of ‘Cherishing the 
Irish Diaspora’. In 2002 the Task Force on Policy towards Emigration set forth a 
bold new agenda for Ireland’s engagement with its diaspora. This agenda 
prioritised redirecting some of the riches of the Celtic Tiger to protect the welfare 
of vulnerable groups within the diaspora living in the United Kingdom and the 
United States. This policy notwithstanding, only five years later, in April 2007, 
Dermot Ahern TD, and then Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced that Ireland 
was to embark upon a major review of its diaspora policy. Set against the 
backdrop of fears that the Irish economic success was running its course, Ahern 
recognised the value of engaging the diaspora so as to nurture mutually 
beneficial relations: 
  
‘The time is right to review our approach to our community across the globe and 
to develop a strategy for the years ahead. Maintaining and enhancing our links 
with our communities abroad has been a particular priority for the government. 
Just as the nature of our diaspora has never been fixed, our attitudes and our 
capacity to engage with the Irish abroad have changed with our nation’s fortunes. 
We need to regularly reshape our policies in this key area and this conference 
will launch this process.’ 
 
3.8 Both cited as exemplars of third wave diaspora strategies and both in the throes 
of much introspection over the future shape of their approaches to their diaspora, 
Scotland and Ireland have much to talk about, compare and contrast, and this 
report aims to contribute this dialogue 
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4. DRAWING BORDERS: WHO BELONGS TO THE DIASPORA? 
4.1 A meaningful diaspora strategy depends upon a clear understanding of who 
belongs to the diaspora. This is in part a pragmatic matter: any strategy needs to 
ration limited resources through careful planning and targeting. It is also, 
however, of significant political concern.  An emerging criticism levelled at 
diaspora strategies around the world – and seeds of this criticism have already 
being sown in the academic literature on Scotland and Ireland’s diaspora 
policies8 – is that they risk the racialisation of economic policy and national 
growth strategies, prioritising the Scots or the Irish as a global tribe and 
potentially overlooking the contribution of other migrant groups resident in 
Scotland and Ireland.  If the concept of diaspora is too narrowly defined the 
boundaries drawn between those included and those excluded might prove to be 
problematic and unhelpful. As such, it becomes critical to identify which 
constituencies ought to be included in Scotland and Ireland’s diaspora strategies 
in order to ensure a wide and cosmopolitan approach.    
4.2 In seeking to draw clearer boundaries some reflection on the wider application of 
the concept is required. Of Greek origin and commonly thought of as popularised 
by Jewish religious history, the notion of diaspora eventually worked its way into 
the social scientific literature in the 1950s, through firstly African Studies and then 
Armenian Studies. Taken to refer in principle to the scattering or scrambling of a 
particular population, in the past decade the concept has diffused widely 
throughout the social sciences and humanities and in so doing has lost much of 
its original meaning. It is possible to identify at least three definitions of diaspora, 
based respectively on the concepts of ‘forced migration’, ‘mass scattering’, and 
‘connectivity’ respectively. Each frames diaspora differently, leading to the 
inclusion and exclusion of different population groups and as a consequence the 
cultivation of different ways of thinking about strategies towards diasporic 
populations. The three definitions are mapped out most clearly in the work of 
William Safran, Robin Cohen and Roza Tsagarousianou9.  
4.3 William Safran’s definition of diaspora conceives of diaspora as only one 
particular form of mass migration, that involving forced exile and a fraught and 
lengthy period of resettlement and planting down of new roots in regions of 
destination.  Diaspora consists of migrations where:  
• Original communities have spread from the homeland to two or more 
countries. 
• These communities are bound to their original geographical locations by a 
common vision, memory, or myth about their homeland. 
• These communities harbour a belief that they will never be accepted by their 
hosts and therefore develop autonomous cultural and social needs.  
                                                 
8 See for instance Zumkhawala-Cook (2005) and Lenten (2007) 
9 Safran (1991), Cohen (1997) and Tsagarousianou (2004) 
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• They believe that they or their descendants will return to the homeland should 
conditions prove favourable.  
• They are strongly motivated to maintain support for their homeland and 
communal consciousness and solidarity enable them to continue to take an 
interest in homeland affairs. 
4.4 Robin Cohen has moved to widen Safran’s definition. Cohen argued that 
diaspora should include those groups who scatter voluntarily as well as those 
who move as a result of aggression, persecution or extreme hardship, should 
only be applied to groups who have settled in a new destination for a relatively 
long time period, should take into account the positive aspects of migrants’ lives 
in regions of destination, should acknowledge that assimilation and integration 
into host cultures does occur and should permit an inclusion of second, third, and 
later generation descendants. Diaspora incorporated all kinds of mass population 
movement and Safran’s definition was overly restrictive. On this basis Cohen 
identified five types of diaspora: 
• Victim diasporas (e.g., classic diasporas forced into exile such as the Jewish, 
African, Armenian diasporas) 
• Labour diasporas (e.g., mass migration in search of work and economic 
opportunities such as the Indian and Turkish diasporas) 
• Trade diasporas (e.g., migrations seeking to open trade routes and links such 
as the Chinese and Lebanese diasporas) 
• Imperial diasporas (e.g., migration among those keen to serve and maintain 
empires such as the British and French diasporas) 
• Cultural diaspora (e.g., those who move through a process of chain migration 
such as the Caribbean diaspora). 
4.5 Whilst widening and loosening the types of migrations which might be included 
there remain limitations to Cohen’s definition. According to Tsagarousianou 
(2004), communications and transportation advances have made mobility so 
efficient today that migration is rarely permanent and there is a need to resist 
thinking of diaspora in terms of permanent settlement.  Diasporas have always 
been more mobile than commonly assumed but today they are more transient 
than they have ever been in history.  The consequence is that connectivity within 
and between the diaspora, both physical and virtual, has never been as dense or 
as extensive.  Diasporas need to be conceived of as being fundamentally 
reworked by new forms of mobility and communication technologies.  Diasporas 
operate on a transnational basis and the term best refers to ‘complex 
multidirectional flows of human beings, ideas, products – cultural and physical, 
and to forms of interaction, negotiation and exchange.’  The implication then is 
that not all expatriates are diasporeans, the term being confined to those who are 
proactively engaged in transnational activity.  
4.6 With a view to further clarity, in this report we endorse Cohen’s widening and 
loosening of the concept of diaspora and argue for an inclusive conceptualization 
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of diaspora as a central component of any diaspora strategy.  Moreover we 
argue that it is important to take seriously and promote the concept of ‘affinity 
diaspora’.  In addition, we propose that it is critical to take seriously forms of 
mobility which are more transitory and the use of the new forms of 
communication which are now available. A new generation of diaspora strategies 
are made possible by new communication and transport technologies.  
Nevertheless the report will not discard entirely the theme of forced migration and 
will note the importance of the exile motif in diaspora formation and in turn 
diaspora strategies.  Diasporas which are underpinned by a communal belief in 
the importance of forced migration and estrangement from ready assimilation in 
settlement regions do provide a different set of resources for diaspora strategies 
and this distinction will prove important in the Scottish and Irish comparison. 
4.7 In this report then the concept of diaspora will be taken to include:   
 
• a collection of people who share a common national, civic or ethnic identity 
and who were either forced to leave or voluntarily left their settled territory and 
became residents in a new territory.  
• descendants of these emigrants who remain interested in their heritage and 
who might be prepared to reengage with their ancestral home.  
• migrants who move in a transient, circular and more nomadic way, leading a 
transnational existence which entails moving into and out of the homeland for 
short periods, including business travellers. 
 
4.8 An affinity diaspora is a collection of people, usually former immigrants and 
tourists or business travellers, who have a different national or ethnic identity to a 
nation state but who feel some special affinity or affection for that nation state 
and who act on its behalf, whilst resident in the state, after they return home, or 
from a third country.    
 
4.9 A diaspora strategy then will be taken to refer to an explicit policy initiative or 
series of policy initiatives enacted by a state, or its peoples, aimed at developing 
relationships between diaspora and affinity diaspora populations.  A diaspora 
strategy needs not be over-determined and can be quite light in conception and 
application, and is best thought of as an overarching framework for providing a 
level of coherence to the range of concrete diaspora policies devised and 
implemented by a variety of public, private, and voluntary agencies.  
4.10 To date neither Scotland nor Ireland has articulated a clear sense of who it 
considers its diaspora to consist of, although a debate in each country has begun 
and some useful pointers provided.  Fortunately neither is lapsing into a narrow 
and restrictive use of the label by default.  Indeed, each has a welcome 
commitment to broadening the concept to include all groups who live overseas 
and who have a special affinity with Scotland and Ireland.  Therein each has 
witnessed the rise of a keen interest in better understanding the structure, scale, 
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form, geography, and causes of migration to and from them10. It is correctly 
assumed that the wider the net is cast the richer the contributions harnessed will 
be.  There is no sense that the turn to the diaspora represents a resort to a form 
of ethnic nationalism and indeed where diaspora policies are worked into 
debates on Scottish and Irish nationalism, they are most commonly framed as 
part of wider appeals to civic nationalisms.  In both cases, there is clearly a 
desire for wider, looser, and more inclusive approaches.  Nevertheless, our 
assessment is that in both Scotland and Ireland most  programmes are designed 
with first generation and descendants of first generation Scottish and Irish 
migrants in mind.  In both cases therefore, there would appear to be scope for, 
firstly, greater engagement with affinity diasporas and, secondly, a heightened 
understanding of how Scottish and Irish people move around the world and 
communicate with home in the twenty first century.    
 
 
                                                 
10 Gilmartin and White (2008), National Institute of Economic and Social Affairs (2008) 
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5. ENGAGING THE DIASPORA  
 
5.1 There are clear constitutional differences between Scotland and Ireland. Whilst it 
is obvious that stronger international branding creates a greater sense of global 
presence and contributes to nation building and diaspora building, it is clearly a 
matter of debate whether the differential constitutional status of Scotland helps or 
hinders its capacity to formulate a diaspora strategy.  Unlike Scotland, Ireland is 
an independent state and in principal has legal sovereignty over the setting of 
taxes, the allocation of all state expenditure, the establishment of law, order, and 
defence, and the setting of international relations.  Scotland in contrast has 
historically been a full member of the United Kingdom and subject to the British 
Parliamentary system.   Since 1999, it has had its own parliament with full 
authority over most public services and a limited amount of power to vary tax 
levels. A number of key reserved powers however remain at the British level 
including the governance of both emigration (consular and embassy services) 
and immigration (immigration policy, rules and systems). In addition, whilst 
Scottish Development International and Scottish Enterprise have overseas 
offices, the Irish Development Agency and Enterprise Ireland would appear to 
have a more extensive international presence.   
 
5.2 Beyond the powers invested in state institutions, the methodologies adopted by 
states when engaging with diasporic populations is also of critical importance. 
Scotland chooses to present itself as a Celtic Lion, in waiting to match and 
perhaps surpass the achievements of the Celtic Tiger. What does it mean to 
aspire to the status of a Tiger or Lion economy?  Whilst for Scotland the Celtic 
Lion appellant might mean little more than an aspiration to achieve world class 
rates of economic growth, for Ireland the concept of Tigerhood is taken more 
seriously to imply a commitment to a certain kind of state and certain kind of 
approach to policy making.  What are the defining features of Tiger states?  Can 
anything be read into Ireland’s alignment with the label ‘Tiger’?  If so, how do 
Tiger states implement diaspora policy and what might Scotland learn, if 
anything, from such a modus operandi?  
 
5.3 Most commentators trace the label Tiger to the economies of the Pacific Asian 
region. This region has been witness to three waves of world class economic 
growth, with Japan pioneering the first wave, the four ‘dragon economies’ of 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore taking up the mantle in the 
second, and finally, the three South East Asian ‘cubs’ of Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia rising to announce the third wave. Subsequently, the economic 
success enjoyed by Vietnam, Myanmar, and China has been taken to constitute 
a fourth wave. Beyond Pacific Asia lie a number of other contenders. Whilst 
Brazil, Mexico, and India have sought to claim Tigerhood for some time, more 
recently countries as diverse as Ireland and Israel, and even Chile, Mauritius, 
and Botswana have attracted the label.  
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5.4 What have these countries got in common?  As the label ‘Tiger’ increasingly 
came to be associated with Ireland so too its growth strategy has come to be 
compared with its Pacific Asian counterparts.  According to Sean O’Riain11 this 
comparison is useful as Irish economic growth was marshalled by a type of 
developmental state that derives from the same family of command capitalism 
practised in the dragon economies. In place of the highly centralised and 
interventionist roles played by state technocrats in Pacific Asia however, the Irish 
state has operated with a more flexible and decentralised command structure 
and has exercised a much lighter touch.  O’Riain argues that whilst the Pacific 
Asian economies are characterised by a bureaucratic developmental state, 
Ireland has grown under the governance of a new type of flexible developmental 
state or developmental networked state.    
 
5.5 The flexible developmental state concept recognizes five ways in which states 
might intervene to promote the development of business.  These are:  
 
Absent – Beyond its legal obligations the state withdraws and allows the market 
to dictate business opportunities. 
Custodian – The state provides protection for business start ups, policing and 
regulating infant industries.  
Midwife – The state attracts private enterprises into new sectors.  
Husbandry – The state teaches, cultivates, nurtures, and prods entrepreneurial 
forces that have already been activated. 
Demiurge – The state has direct involvement in productive activities, often with 
the intention of denationalizing later.   
 
5.6 According to O’Riain, as a flexible developmental state, the Irish state performs 
more midwifery or husbandry functions.  It does so through the principal of 
‘embedded autonomy’, networking within the business community and placing 
state interests into business networks whilst remaining outside of the business 
community and its imperatives.  The Irish state is a light state in terms of the 
number of civil servants per capita and consequently has honed a talent for 
building capacity and working in partnership with the business community, trade 
unions, the voluntary sector, and civil society.  Embedded autonomy has served 
as a useful strategy for getting things done without orchestrating or determining 
in an overly centralized fashion.   
 
5.7 Whether Scotland can be classified as a developmental state and indeed 
whether it aspires to such a classification is beyond the scope of this report.  
What is relevant nevertheless, is the application of this approach to diaspora 
policy.  When applied to diaspora policy this typology leads to at least five 
different ways of engaging diasporic groups:  
 
Absent – The state leaves the formation of links between the homeland and the 
diaspora to the market or to autonomous social, cultural and political movements. 
                                                 
11 O’Riain (2000; 2004) 
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Custodian – The state nurtures, protects, regulates, and polices new and 
emerging diasporic connections. 
Midwife – The state identifies new sectors and locations it wishes to connect 
with and mobilizes and cultivates key individuals and communities to make these 
connections happen. 
Husbandry – The state reenergizes and rebrands existing networks and plays a 
formative role in the shaping the trajectory of networks. 
Demiurge – The state directly creates and runs diasporic initiatives and 
networks, perhaps with the intention of letting the market assume responsibility at 
a later date.  
 
5.8 From our discussions with Scottish and Irish managers of various diaspora 
schemes, and our analysis of policy documents, it seems that there is a 
discernible difference in the ethos and practices underpinning the administration 
of the various diaspora programmes.  Both countries clearly have initiatives 
which have been instituted by organisations outside the state, either from the 
homeland or from the diaspora. Whilst important exceptions exist, in the Scottish 
case, where the state does get involved it functions largely as the lead player and 
most significant manager, whilst in the Irish case the state primarily seeks a 
midwifery or husbandry role lightly incubating existing initiatives or seeding new 
initiatives.  Irish diaspora policy is more light in touch and consistent with its 
status as a flexible developmental state; meanwhile Scottish diaspora policy is 
more muscular and has a greater degree of state involvement at all stages of the 
process.  
 
5.9 All the schemes that Scottish Government agencies engage with, as far as we 
are aware, are funded and managed by those agencies.  The Scottish schemes 
are underpinned strongly by new managerial structures and processes that 
emphasise accountability, transparency, productivity and value for money.  The 
Scottish Government initiatives are accompanied by defined targets and 
associated metrics for measuring progress and success.  A scheme is therefore 
defined as a success or failure depending on how much economic value it can be 
demonstrated to have leveraged over a specific (usually very short) period.  
There is clearly an important rationale for moving to new forms of public 
administration and placing greater demands on measuring value for money and 
ensuring transparency and accountability in the expenditure of public funds.  
Democratic systems require public confidence in the efficiency of state run 
organisations.  Nevertheless, such managerialism can circumscribe how 
schemes are conceived, structured and run, and for all its benefits may 
potentially limit the development of schemes that would have a multitude of 
intangible benefits. 
 
5.10 The Irish schemes are slowly transferring to this form of managerialism, 
especially with regards to accountability and transparency of spend12, but there 
remains a greater recognition of the intangible benefits gained by fostering an 
                                                 
12 See for example the recent Goodbody Report (2007) on the work of the Irish Abroad Unit 
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engagement with the diaspora and an appreciation of the timeframe over which 
dividends will be returned.  Rather than manage a small set of highly controlled 
schemes, the Irish strategy has been ‘to let a thousand flowers bloom’.  To that 
end, Ireland supports existing organisations without seeking any control and 
encourages the development of new social networks run by the diaspora for the 
diaspora (using the diaspora’s own resources).  This approach uses of the ideas 
of light incubation and does practice forms of ‘embedded autonomy’ wherein the 
Irish state leaves an organisation/network to run itself, providing some minimal 
resources when needed (basic funding, advice, speakers, etc), and only steps in 
when the organisation/network needs to be re-energised.   
 
5.11 The idea is to foster the organic growth of networks with as light a government 
input as possible.  This is partly to keep investment at a low level, but is mainly 
because it is believed that organic networks are more likely to succeed than 
those that are highly managed.  For instance, and with specific respect to 
business networks, Enterprise Ireland invests selective but light resources (some 
of which are in-kind rather than financial) into over sixty Irish business networks 
around the world.  This strategy is believed to enhance a sense of Irish-
mindedness across a very large number of business people and produces all 
kinds of tangible and intangible benefits that trickle back to Ireland through 
inward business investment, high quality economic or political advice, tourism 
visits, and philanthropy.  The metrics used to assess this strategy focus on the 
quality and strength of the network, feedback from clients, number of quotations 
and contracts, but there is no rigid and robust economic metric. For Ireland, the 
challenge will be to find appropriate ways of undertaking more value for money 
assessments without calibrating measures of success so that they undermine the 
schemes they are intended to assess.  
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6 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH DIASPORA 
 
6.1 The scale, geography, social structure, and character of diasporic populations 
play a significant role in shaping their capacity and inclination to connect with the 
homeland. Prior to the nineteenth century, Scotland had a long history of 
emigration to Europe, including to Ireland. Between 1821 and 1945, and in 
waves concentrated particularly in the 1850s, 1870s, early 1900s and the 
interwar period, over two million migrants left Scotland, more than half to the 
USA with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand being other important 
destinations.  Following the Second World War and lasting up to the 1990s, 
Scotland was a country that suffered from brain drain, the 1960s in particular 
witnessing a net, negative annual migration balance of -40,000. England, and, in 
particular, the South East became an important destination. Throughout the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries Scotland has played host to Irish (particularly 
from the 1840s to the 1920s), Jewish and Lithuanian (1890s to 1910), Italian 
(interwar years), Polish (post war), as well as Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi 
(1960s) migrants.  However, since 1990, Scotland has enjoyed a net migrant 
gain peaking following the accession of Eastern European states to the EU in 
2004 at +25,000 (Figure 1).  Moreover, in-migrants to Scotland are more likely to 
be more qualified and skilled than out-migrants, Scotland attracts more students 
than it exports, and retains the highest proportion of graduates than any region in 
the UK13.  
 
                                                 
13 Houston et al. (2008) 
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Figure 1 - Scotland: Key components of population change 1952 
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Figure 2 - Ireland: Key components of population change 1952 
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6.2 Migration from Ireland to Europe dates to the missionary and mercenary 
migrations in the sixth to the fifteenth centuries. From the eighteenth century 
migration to the new world, principally the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand, dominated14. Between 1700 and 1920 the Irish population (whole 
island) fell from 8.2 million people to 4.2 million with an estimated three million 
people emigrating abroad.  Included in this stream were the flight of the Scotch-
Irish to North America between 1705 and 1776, the famine migrants in the 
1840s, and the economic migrants of the period from the 1850s to the 
establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922.  In the twentieth century, Ireland 
has continued to suffer from net migration loss, peaking in the 1950s and 1980s 
with the United Kingdom emerging as the chief destination region15.  With the 
country’s economic fortunes reversing from 1993, however, Ireland too has 
witnessed a parallel reversal in its migration fortunes. Between 1991 and 2006 
Ireland attracted a net gain of nearly 350,000 migrants, with over half of incoming 
migrants being returnees (Figure 2).Whilst the largest migrant group remains the 
British, migrants have come from every continent and broadened Ireland’s 
demographic base significantly.  As with Scotland, Ireland has played host to 
post-accession Eastern European flows, particularly from Poland and Lithuania.    
 
6.3 Table 2 shows key statistics pertinent to the Scottish and Irish diasporas and 
potential affinity diasporas.  It is clear that in spite of their differences, some 
broad similarities exist between both countries. Both are small European 
countries; both have approximately one quarter of their existing population living 
overseas, principally in England; both participated in the great European 
migrations to the New World and have longer diasporic ties with the United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; from being an exporter of talent 
both have enjoyed net migrant gains since 1990, albeit Ireland at a greater scale; 
both have significant populations from the EU accession states; both attract a 
significant volume of overseas students, with Scotland being more of a magnet; 
and finally both are significant tourist locations.         
 
                                                 
14 Akenson (2003) 
15 Delaney (2000) 
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Table 2 – Scotland and Ireland’s Diaspora and Affinity Diasporas 
 Scotland Ireland 
   
Population Size  5,144,200 (2007) 4,422,100 (2008) 
Net Migration  +20,400 (average annual 
since 2003) 
+43,900 (average annual 
since 2000) 
Scale of Diaspora (native 
born, overseas) 
1,267,500 800,000 Irish born overseas. 
3.1 million Irish Citizens 
(Passport holders) overseas 
Geography of Diaspora  800,000 in England, 467,500 
non UK16 
500,000 in UK, 156,000 in 
USA, 50,000 in Australia, 
22,800 in Canada, 16,000 
France, 16,000 Germany, 
8,000 Spain 
Scale of Wider Diaspora 
(people claiming ancestry) 
28 million to 40 million17 70 to 80 million 
Geography of Wider Diaspora  USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand 
Today 44 million claim to be 
Irish American, 6 million 
people in Britain claim Irish 
ancestry, there are 3.8 million 
Irish Canadians and 1.9 million 
Irish Australians 500,000 
people in Argentina have Irish 
ancestry.  
Number of Foreign Born 
Residents  
168,142 Scotland residents 
were born outside of the UK 
(+34% since 1991; 3.3% 
compared to 7.5% for the 
whole of the UK, 2001 census) 
419,733 (2006) 
Geography of Foreign Born 
Residents  
The largest group was from 
Germany, followed by 
Pakistan and the US (2001 
census) 
A large number of foreign-born 
residents in 2006 were from 
the United Kingdom (112,000) 
Eastern European accession 
countries (163,227), Asian 
countries (46,952) and African 
countries (35,326) (2006 
census) 
Number of Overseas Students 
(UG and PG) 
58,095 overseas students (for 
academic year 2006/07). This 
figure does not include the 
28,290 students from other 
parts of the UK  
25,319 (for academic year 
2005/06) 
                                                 
16 Quoted in Eirich and McLaren (2007) 
17 Quoted in Eirich and McLaren (2007) 
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Geography of Overseas 
Students 
In 2006-2007, most non-
Scottish students enrolled in a 
Scottish institution of further 
education were from England 
(2,350). Other important 
groups were from India (1.430) 
and from other European 
countries (Italy, Spain, Poland, 
France) 
In 2005-2006, 15,196 
overseas students or 57% of 
the total were from non-EU 
countries (including India, 
China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, 
South Korea and Thailand) 
Tourist Visits (non 
Scottish/Irish) 
9.59 million 6.8 million UK, 
2.79 overseas  
8.01 million, 4.01 million from 
the UK, 4 million from non 
UK/Ireland sources 
All data from official government sources unless otherwise stated. 
 
6.4 Where both diasporas would appear to differ most is not in their scale or 
geography but in their cultural dispositions.  Given the cultural characteristics of 
their respective diaspora, the extent to which Scottish or Irish born migrants and 
subsequent generations consider themselves to be Scottish or Irish differs. This 
view was prevalent among both Scottish and Irish interviewees and whilst largely 
anecdotal would seem to reveal an important truth.  In general, Irish-mindedness 
– the strength of Irish identity and an allegiance or patriotism to Ireland – seems 
better developed than Scottish-mindedness.  This is perhaps most clearly 
reflected in the number of active Irish diaspora organisations around the world, 
which number several thousand.   
 
6.5 In the course of undertaking interviews for this project it became evident that 
there exists a strong belief in Scotland that the Scottish diaspora is less visible 
and less well organised than the Irish diaspora.  There is a belief  that migrating 
Scots were more quickly accepted by the host populations, adopted the identity 
of regions of destination more readily and assimilated within a single generation.   
Scots tended to choose to leave to seek a better life elsewhere, rather than 
migrating because there seemed little other viable option.  As a result, Scottish 
identity and Scottish-mindedness very rapidly dissipated to become a ‘historical 
badge’ little worn or displayed except on particular occasions such as St 
Andrews Day or Tartan Day or Burns Night or during significant sporting 
occasions. Whilst sharing a Scottish ancestry clearly mattered, the concerns and 
tribulations of the domestic country proved to be immediately arresting and 
primary loyalties were more readily redirected from the old to the new homeland.  
 
6.6 In contrast, a commonly held view is that the migrating Irish most often left due to 
economic necessity or for political reasons. Even when they moved for reasons 
of self advancement, homesickness, alienation, and an elevated interest in Irish 
nationalism persisted as a consequence of traditional Gaelic attitudes to 
migration, which led migrants to justify themselves not as voluntary, ambitious 
emigrants, but as involuntary, non-responsible ‘exiles’, compelled to leave home 
by forces beyond individual control18.  The Irish faced hostility in regions of 
                                                 
18 Miller (1985) 
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settlement as a consequence of their race (Celtic), class (poorest of the poor), 
nationality (Irish), and religion (Catholic).  For a time, anti-Irish racism 
suppressed upward mobility and fuelled a sense of estrangement and cultural 
difference.  With few resources, they often ended up living in the same poor 
neighbourhoods, forming Irish enclaves where Irish culture was kept alive.  In 
addition, the poor state of Ireland and the political conflict in the North led to the 
maintenance of direct connections back to the homeland through remittances 
and political support, the latter of which also helped to keep alive Irish 
nationalism.  
 
6.7 It is important to note, however, that while the Irish diaspora appears in general 
to be more coherently organized than the Scottish diaspora, it has varying 
intensities and forms in different locales given the size of the community and 
because patriotism, interest and commitment to Ireland vary across time and 
space.  Even in locales where diaspora identities and activities are considered to 
be strong many people are little if at all involved in the diaspora groups or 
activities.  It should also be noted that until relatively recently the Irish diaspora 
had largely self-organised itself through organic processes, along with help from 
the Catholic Church, and the Irish state has traditionally not sought to manage 
the diaspora in an overly-determined way.  The move in recent years to actively 
engage and support the diaspora through the schemes detailed below is then a 
relatively new development driven by a concern amongst some Irish 
commentators that the strength of Irish identity overseas might be on the wane 
for a number of reasons: the numbers of Irish-born emigrating has dropped 
markedly reducing first generation stock that tend to be the most active; the 
political and economic rationale for maintaining ties to Ireland has dissipated 
given the peace process and Ireland’s economic miracle; and the ‘greying’ of the 
diaspora community leaders without significant numbers of readily identifiable 
replacements.  That said, Irish-mindedness remains strong and the Irish 
Government recognises the value in investing in trying to maintain this strength.   
 
6.8 One of the principal differences between Scotland and Ireland then is that 
Scotland might need to work harder if it is to engage its overseas communities as 
it cannot rely on the spontaneous self organisation of the diaspora.  And yet 
Scottish-mindedness is essential to any diaspora programme as the Scottish 
diaspora will only do work for and alongside Scotland over the long-term if they 
harbour a deep sense of Scottishness and a pride and allegiance to Scotland. It 
is clear that a whole number of initiatives now underway will play an important 
role to this end. These include but are not limited to:  
 
Global Scot – a business network connecting highly skilled Scots around the 
world.   
Global Friends of Scotland – a social and community network linking overseas 
Scots   
Homecoming 2009 – a flagship campaign seeking to encourage tourist visits 
and perhaps a longer term relationship between Scotland and its diaspora. 
 26
Tartan Day and Scotland Week  – An official day set aside in the United States 
(and other countries) to celebrate the heritage and legacy of Scottish emigrants; 
Scotland Week held alongside this to promote links with Scotland.   
The central web portal Scotland.org – An official gateway to Scotland serving 
as a one stop shop for a variety of user groups. 
Creative Scotland – an organisation that once established will bededicated to 
promoting Scottish culture and arts both at home and abroad. 
Fresh Talent Initiative and Talent Scotland – Agencies which includes the 
Relocation Advisory Service established to promote skilled migration, including 
return migration, to Scotland.  
AncestralScotland.com website and ScotlandsPeople Resources – The 
former a VisitScotland tourist promotion web site, the latter a government backed 
partnership between the General Register Office for Scotland, the National 
Archives of Scotland and The Court of the Lord Lyon, including a website and the 
new Scotlands People Centre in Edinburgh, which is a resource for ancestral 
visitors seeking genealogical research materials. 
The Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies at Edinburgh University – A new 
research centre serving as a focal point for research on the Scottish diaspora.  
 
6.9 Beyond their instrumental utility, each of these initiatives plays a symbolically 
important role in heightening awareness of Scotland and Scottishness within the 
diaspora. There would seem to be a movement underway with a reasonable 
degree of combined mass.  Important initiatives are underway and already are 
enjoying success. Nevertheless, given the scale of the task at hand it would 
seem that a more significant ramping up of projects designed to nurture Scottish-
mindedness might again be required.  Culture and identity building is a long term 
and complex project and achievements are not easily prerserved or sustained.  It 
is here that the constitutional debate in Scotland, the strength of Scottish cultural 
identity overseas, and Scotland’s diaspora policy all once again intersect. The 
critical question would appear to be, can the Scottish diaspora be most 
successfully built up through programmes, activities, and outreach work 
undertaken with the existing constitutional arrangements or would an 
independent Scotland provide a stronger set of culture building tools and 
instruments ?  
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7. THE RATIONALE FOR ENGAGING THE DIASPORA 
 
7.1 Scotland and Ireland will require different diaspora strategies simply because the 
conditions which motivate them to engage their respective diaspora populations 
are different. Scotland’s turn to its diaspora stems from debates in the early 
2000s about impending skill shortages. The growth of skill shortages through 
time in any economy can be said to derive from one of three sources: a growth of 
that economy relative to the working age population; a decline of the working age 
population relative to the economy; or a growing mismatch in the skills inherent in 
the labour market relative to the skills required by the economy. A relatively 
poorly performing economy at the periphery of Europe, Scotland’s skill shortages 
could not in truth be attributed to the success of its economy.  Instead, attention 
was given first, and foremost to the impact of the absolute decline of the 
country’s working age population; and secondly the nation’s limited ability to 
serve as an incubator for members of what, following Richard Florida19 was 
referred to as the ‘creative class’. 
  
7.2 In the early 2000s it was believed that the Scottish population was in decline and 
that Scotland occupied premier position in the European league table of shrinking 
populations.  There was a fear that Scotland’s population could dip below 5 
million. The contribution of Scotland’s demographic trends to emerging skill 
shortages derived from the problem of falling birth rates and an ageing 
population structure.  Scotland feared that it could not meet replacement demand 
that would occur in the labour market (existing jobs that will need to be filled due 
to retirements)20.  Secondly, Scotland began to take an interest in Richard 
Florida’s ideas regarding the importance of the creative class to economic growth 
and saw a need to prospect for a larger share of creative members of society.  
Independently of the absolute shortage of skills that would derive from unmet 
replacement demand, the shortage of pools of creative talent in the economy 
was in itself a problem.   
    
7.3 Increasingly the attractiveness of Scotland to immigrants and fortifying positive 
net migration was the diagnosis and The Fresh Talent Scotland Initiative and the 
Relocation Advisory Service were the principal products. Scotland was to 
proactively attract students, business people, other workers, entrepreneurs, and 
Scottish expatriates. Fostering return migration then, to deal with the country’s 
low birth rates, projected demographic shrinking, skill shortages, and absence of 
creative talent, emerged de facto as its primary relation to its diaspora.  
Expatriates already had a sense of connection to Scotland and could be more 
easily lured back by the magnets of good educational and career opportunities, a 
cosmopolitan and tolerant multi-cultural ethos, a vibrant night time economy and 
series of consumption opportunities, and by the desire to bring up families and 
care for parents in their old age. 
                                                 
19 Florida (2002) 
20 Future Skills Scotland (2003) 
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7.4 It has now become apparent that Scotland’s population is stable if not growing 
slightly, that fertility levels have risen, and that no significant skill shortages exist, 
albeit that the country suffers from relatively low levels of self-employment and 
entrepreneurial activity and could benefit from labour market expansion in these 
areas21. Against this backdrop, a new set of rationales for engaging with the 
diaspora has developed, rationales which have been prompted in part by the 
publication of the Scottish Government’s new Economic Strategy in 2007 and its 
International Framework22.  Three aspects of this strategy have important 
consequences for the framing of diaspora strategy23:  
 
7.5 Demographic – There remains a belief that population growth will be an 
important stimulus to the economic development of Scotland and as such that 
the promotion of population growth remains a key policy concern.  Scotland has 
set itself the target of matching the average European EU (EU15) population 
growth over the period from 2007 to 2017.  Beyond natural increase, it is 
estimated that to meet this target Scotland will require an annual net migration 
balance of +22,000.  Encouraging return migration represents one way to work 
towards this target.  
 
7.6 Economic – In the period 1975 to 2005 the average annual GDP growth rate in 
Scotland was 1.8%, lower than the UK average of 2.3%, and significantly lower 
than the Irish rate of 5.2%24.  As a consequence the Scottish Government has 
set itself the targets of raising Scotland’s GDP growth rate to the UK level by 
2011, and matching the GDP growth rate of the small independent EU countries 
by 2017.  In so far as diasporic populations can help Scottish businesses 
compete in the world market and help broker transnational capital investment into 
Scotland, the diaspora can help the Scottish economy to become ‘smarter’ and 
‘wealthier’.  
 
7.7 Cultural – The Scottish National Party is currently in power in Scotland and the 
nation is in the throes of debate over the extent to which full independence or 
continued Union with the rest of the United Kingdom will best serve its interests 
into the future.  It is presumed that a strong cultural identity and sense of national 
confidence will be important if Scotland is to match both the demographic and 
economic growth rates achieved by small independent European States.  To 
conceive of Scotland as a globally networked population of 40 million people is 
arguably a more powerful way to think.  It is clear that a strong cultural 
attachment to Scotland is a prerequisite for all other efforts to engage diasporic 
groups and as noted throughout this report there is a debate to be had as to 
whether such an attachment can be secured best as an independent nation or as 
a member of the United Kingdom.  
                                                 
21 Houston et al (2008) 
22  Scottish Government (2007) 
23 As specified in the Scottish Government International Framework (2008) 
24 Scottish Government (2007) 
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7.8 Ireland is a country that has undergone enormous transformations since the start 
of the 1990s.  Up to that point, Ireland was a poor nation on the periphery of 
Europe characterised by a weak economy and high emigration.  During the 
1980s, Ireland was in severe recession.  Inflation and unemployment rates were 
high (unemployment was over 18% in 1985) and in 1987, Irish GDP was 63% of 
the EU average making it the second poorest country in the EU behind 
Portugal25.  Unsurprisingly, the dire economic situation led to widespread 
emigration.  Between 1981 and 1985, net out-migration was on average 15,000 
people each year, rising to 35,000 per year between 1986 and 1989.  Crucially 
this emigration included large numbers of young, well-educated people seeking a 
better life overseas, with 70% of all emigrants under the age of twenty-five26. 
 
7.9 In contrast, from 1994 until the last couple of years Ireland has been the fastest 
growing and highest performing economy in Europe with year-on-year GDP 
growth often double or more its European neighbours, and wealth levels in terms 
of average income amongst the highest of any developed nation.  In 2003, the 
OECD estimated that in terms of GDP per capita, based on Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPS), Ireland was ranked 4th in the world27.  Accompanying the 
economic boom was a growth in the labour force and a fall in unemployment.  
Between 1992 and 2004 the number of workers increased by 755,000 from 
1.165m to 1.920m.  Unemployment dropped from 15% in 1993 to stabilise 
around 4% by 2000.  While many would argue that Ireland’s economy is 
relatively robust, the situation is undoubtedly in a period of change with Ireland’s 
economy now in recession and unemployment growing rapidly to its highest level 
since 1997. 
    
7.10 These dramatic changes to the economy led to equally dramatic adjustments to 
the demography of the country.  Between 1996 and 2006 the population of the 
state grew by 16.8% to 4.23m.  Births exceeded deaths by almost 140,000 
between 1996 and 2002 leading to a strong natural increase in population28.  
Emigration fell steadily during the 1990s, accompanied by a rapid growth of 
immigrants so that the country became a net-importer of people after 1996.  Up 
to 2004 and the arrival of large numbers of migrants from accession-state 
countries, approximately half of all in-migrants were Irish-born returnees.  
According to the 2006 census there were 419,733 people living in Ireland who 
were born outside the state, including a large number of East Europeans 
(163,227), Asian (46,952) and Africans (35,326).  The Central Statistics Office 
reported that immigrants represented 9.93% of total population (4,239,848) in 
2006.  This was almost certainly a large undercount given the number of active 
PPS numbers and in-migration has continued in the intervening time especially 
from the EU accession countries (particularly Poland and Lithuania).  Given the 
                                                 
25 Breathnach (1998) 
26 NESC (1991) 
27 ESRI (2005) 
28 Walsh (2005) 
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present economic downturn there is anecdotal evidence that some of these 
immigrants are now leaving the country, but as yet the scale of that out-migration 
is unknown. 
 
7.11 In 2002, as a reflection of the country’s new found wealth, Ireland’s Task Force 
on Policies towards Emigration, drawing on a full scale mapping of the Irish 
diaspora29, recommended extending certain welfare rights to overseas 
populations, especially vulnerable groups (the elderly, the sick, the poor and 
prisoners) who left Ireland in the 1950s and the 1980s to move to British cities.  
Cast as recompense for the failure of Irish domestic economic policy in the 1950s 
and the 1980s and in gratitude for the significant flows of remittance monies 
which these migrant groups repatriated, a raft of welfare and citizen advice 
schemes were introduced, including the appointment of overseas welfare officers 
in British cities.  In the past five years, Ireland’s policy towards its diaspora has 
been motivated by a concern about what the country might give the diaspora 
back.  Nevertheless there have recently emerged two additional rationales for 
reinvigorating connections with the diaspora.  
  
7.12 Cultural – There is growing concern that the strength of diasporic attachment and 
affiliation to Ireland might be waning and that a certain level of disenchantment 
exists. As noted above, this can be read as one of the consequences of the 
peace process in Northern Ireland, the fact that the rise of the Celtic Tiger has 
undermined the logic of supporting the country and wider secular trends within 
society in regions of settlement.  As a consequence priority is now being given, 
not least in the country’s Cultural Policy to the nurturing of the social and cultural 
life of the diaspora and its continued enthusiasm for matters Irish.  
 
7.13 Economic – Ireland’s success has been down to its capacity to compete 
successfully in the global economy. The first and most widely recognised tactic 
has been built around attracting foreign investment and to a limited degree 
embedding it into the local economy – the global goes local. The second, and 
more surprising tactic given Irish economic history, is the emergence of a local 
network of indigenous firms that have become increasingly integrated into 
international business and technology flows and have been highly successful in 
international markets – the local goes global.  There is growing recognition that 
diasporic networks have a role to play in increasing the density of the webs of 
connection which exist between domestic capital and transnational capital.  As a 
consequence, Enterprise Ireland in particular is increasingly seeking ways of 
establishing diaspora business networks or diaspora knowledge networks in 
different locations, of different sizes, and in different sectors of the economy.  
 
                                                 
29 Walter et al. (2002) 
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8 CONCRETE DIASPORA POLICES PURSUED BY EACH  
COUNTRY  
 
8.1 Given constitutional, economic, demographic and managerial differences, 
variances in the nature of their respective diaspora and the level of their nation-
mindedness, and differing social, economic, cultural and demographic 
trajectories it is perhaps no surprise that the Irish and Scottish existing diaspora 
policies and concrete projects of engagement  are relatively dissimilar. These 
differences can be categorised in terms of support for overseas populations, 
business networks and ties, policies towards returnees, policies towards affinity 
diaspora, philanthropy, and the social and cultural building of the diaspora. Using 
these categories, Table 3 provides an overview of the main differences between 
both countries. 
 
Table 3 – Summary of Scottish and Irish State supported diaspora policies 
  
SCOTLAND 
 
IRELAND 
 
UK Department of Foreign Affairs: 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
 
Department of Foreign Affairs – Irish 
Abroad Unit 
Political representation abroad through 
network of British embassies and 
consulates around the world 
 
Network of embassies and consulates 
around the world 
Participation in EU, UN, WHO, OECD 
and OECD 
 
Participation in EU, UN, WHO, OECD and 
OECD 
British Council  Díon, the Irish Government’s advisory 
committee on Irish emigrant welfare in 
Britain 
 
 The Department of Education and 
Science – overseas child abuse victim 
redress 
 
 Irish Council for Prisoners Overseas 
 
 The Emigrant Advice Network (Éan) 
 
SUPPORT FOR 
OVERSEAS 
POPULATIONS 
 The Department of Social and Family 
Affairs 
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Scottish Enterprise, Scottish 
Development International (SDI) 
 
Enterprise Ireland, Industrial Development 
Agency (IDA) Ireland 
Specialist Knowledge Networks : 
Specialist sectoral interests within within 
Global 
Specialist Knowledge Networks : the Irish 
Technology Leadership Group, Biolink 
USA-Ireland, Techlink UK-Ireland 
 
Professional Knowledge Networks : 
Scots in London/ScotsIn: the Scottish 
Business and People Network 
(www.scotsin.com) 
 
Professional Knowledge Networks : Irish 
Network New York, Irish Network San 
Francisco, Irish Professional Network of 
London 
 
Transnational Business Networks : 
“British-other nationality” business 
associations, work of Scottish Council for 
Development and Industry (SCDI) and 
Scottish Development International (SDI) 
 
Transnational Business Networks : “Irish-
other nationality” business associations 
BUSINESS 
NETWORKS 
SUPPORTED BY 
THE SCOTTISH 
AND IRISH 
STATE (FOR 
INSTANCE BY 
SCOTTISH 
ENTERPRISE 
AND  
ENTERPRISE 
IRELAND) 
Global Knowledge Networks : Globalscot 
and The SaltireFoundation  
 
Global Knowledge Networks : Asia Pacific 
Ireland Business Forum, The Ireland 
Funds. 
Fresh Talent Initiative’s Relocation 
Advisory Service and TalentScotland 
 
FÁS sponsored international recruitment 
fairs 
The web portal 
www.scotlandistheplace.com 
 
The Emigrant Advice Network (Éan) 
Homecoming Scotland 2009 campaign 
 
Safe Home  
 
 Crosscare Migrant Project (Emigrant 
Advice) 
 
 
 
 
RETURNEES 
 
 
 
 The Department of Environment, Heritage 
and Local Government - voluntary 
housing capital assistance scheme 
 
Scottish Networks International (SNI) 
 
IBEC: Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation and IBEC’s Export 
Orientation Programme (EOP) 
 
Fresh Talent Initiative including Fresh 
Talent: Working in Scotland Scheme and 
the Relocation Advisory Service 
 
No equivalent 
Scotland’s International Development 
work  
Ireland’s International Development work  
 
AFFINITY 
DIASPORA  
Other diasporas’ organisations in 
Scotland 
 
Other diasporas’ organisations in Ireland 
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The Scotland Funds (inactive) 
 
The Ireland Funds 
The American-Scottish Foundation  The International Fund for Ireland 
 
PHILANTHROPY 
 
 The Atlantic Philanthropies 
 
Scottish Cultural Policy and Creative 
Scotland 
 
Ireland’s Cultural Policy and Culture 
Ireland 
 
Scottish clubs and local organizations 
abroad 
 
Irish clubs and local organizations abroad 
 
Worldwide celebrations of Tartan Day 
and Scotland Week, St Andrew’s Day, 
Burns’ Night 
 
Worldwide celebrations of Saint Patrick’s 
Day 
Scotland.Org web portal Emigrant Media including Emigrant News 
Online and RTÉ: Ireland’s Public Service 
Broadcaster 
 
Research Centres such as The Scottish 
Centre for Diaspora Studies (Universdity 
of Edinburgh) 
 
Research Centres such as the John 
Hume Institute for Global Irish Studies 
(University College Dublin), Irish Diaspora 
Forum 
Scottish University Alumni Societies  Irish University Alumni Societies  
 
Scottish socio-cultural websites such as 
the US Scots website 
 
Irish socio-cultural websites such as 
IrishAbroad.com and Europeanirish.com 
 
Visit Scotland, Homecoming 2009, and 
EventScotland.  
 
Tourism Ireland 
 
Global Friends of Scotland  
CULTURE AND 
SOCIAL 
BUILDING OF 
THE DIASPORA  
INCLUDING 
TOURISM 
POLICY 
AncestralScotland.com website and 
ScotlandsPeople Resources 
National Archives of Ireland and Irish 
Ancestral Research Association 
 
 
8.2 Vulnerable groups 
Since 1984 the Irish Government, through the Díon Committee, has provided 
grants to support the employment of professional workers in the UK to offer 
advice and practical assistance to disadvantaged members of the Irish 
community.  Since 2003, the Díon Committee has been supplemented by the 
Irish Abroad Unit in the Department of Foreign Affairs.  The Irish Abroad Unit 
runs the Emigrant Groups Programme under which grants are provided to 
voluntary organisations that support vulnerable Irish citizens abroad.  In 2006 
over 220 welfare officers in UK were supported along with a number of capital 
projects.  Other grants support the social, sporting and heritage activities of Irish 
emigrants (e.g. GAA clubs, Kennedy Library Irish-American collection) and the 
Emigrants Advice Network (EAN).  The Department of the Environment, Local 
Government and Heritage provides funding to voluntary housing bodies to make 
up to 25% of accommodation available to elderly returning emigrants who satisfy 
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eligibility criteria and are on the waiting list of the Safe Home Programme.  The 
Department of Education and Science supports a number of schemes designed 
to investigate and redress past abuse of Irish children within state agencies who 
subsequently emigrated, supplies outreach services to such citizens, and until 
recently provided an educational grant scheme for former residents and their 
families. The Irish Commission for Prisoners Overseas supports Irish citizens 
incarcerated abroad.  The Aisling Return to Ireland Project provides an annual 
supported holiday and aftercare for long-term, vulnerable Irish migrants to Britain.  
We are not aware of any such similar schemes operated by the Scottish 
government directly, although it maybe the case that some are operated by the 
UK government on behalf of all UK citizens. 
 
8.3 Business Networks 
Scotland and Ireland have both put significant resources in the past few years 
into building business relationships with their respective diaspora.  As noted 
above, how they have gone about this is recognisably different.  Indeed, it is here 
that differences in the methodologies used to engage the diaspora most depart. 
In the main, the Scottish approach focuses on fostering high quality relationships 
between specific individuals and businesses, whereas the Irish approach focuses 
on developing broad-based social networking and community building.  Ireland 
then has a more plural strategy that aims to foster a number of business 
networks and to grow a wide base of contacts and expertise.  At present, 
Enterprise Ireland (EI) supports, through in-kind or financial aid, over sixty Irish 
business networks around the world.  Some of these were initially seeded by EI 
such as Techlink and Biolink and others were started by Irish business people 
abroad.  In the main, networks are owned and run by their members and function 
as social networking sites, many of whom also organise regular face-to-face 
meetings.  In Scotland, the focus to date has been upon building up one 
particularly critical network, Globalscot, a widely cited exemplar of an impressive 
network of global elites.  This network, managed by Scottish Enterprise, does not 
function as a social network but rather as a broker, linking Scottish businesses 
and specific Globalscot members.    
 
8.4 Business networks play a critical role in the emerging knowledge economy.  
Diaspora knowledge networks are overseas networks that mobilise the skills, 
expertise, contacts, knowledge, business acumen, and financial and political 
resources of diasporeans as a collective resource to benefit the local and global 
diaspora as well as the homeland.  It is useful distinguishing four kinds of 
diaspora knowledge network30: 
 
8.5 Specialist Knowledge Networks  
These are networks which are sector specific (for instance biotechnology, ICT, 
law) and which generate dense and specific ties to the homeland to aid the 
expansion of respective sectors, for instance through providing knowledge, 
                                                 
30 This classification is based on the on-going research work of Aine O’Neill on elite Irish business 
networks. 
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mentoring, expertise and finance (venture capital).  In the Irish case examples 
include the Irish Technology Leadership Group in Silicon Valley (an elite network 
of Irish corporate leaders who support the Irish ICT sector through the soliciting 
of Irish business ideas in a Dragon’s Den format31), Biolink (a network of 
biotechnical professionals spread across the USA), and Techlink UK (a network 
of Irish scientists based in London looking to commercialise laboratory 
breakthroughs). Whilst there would appear to be no obvious example of such a 
network in the Scottish diaspora, GlobalScot does have a variety of sector 
interests and specialisms  
 
8.6 Professional Knowledge Networks 
These are regional and local networks of professional and highly skilled 
expatriates located in cosmopolitan cities.  The focus is upon dual social and 
business networking and the exchange of contacts, skills, advice and ideas.  The 
nearest Scottish example that we are aware of is the ‘Scots In’ network.  This 
social networking site describes itself as a global Scottish business and people 
network.  Originally based in London, it is now transforming itself into a global 
network and already has over 5,000 members.  As well as online services the 
network has started to organise face to face events.  In the Irish case examples 
include the Irish Network New York, the Irish Network San Francisco, and the 
Irish Professional Network of London, each with over 1,000 members.  
 
8.7 Transnational Business Networks 
These are networks whose primary purpose is the fostering of economic ties 
between the destination region and the homeland.  Here the diaspora plays the 
role of a broker of relationships to a particular country.  The network resources 
produced include knowledge of markets, cultural knowledge and access to 
transnational opportunities. In the Irish case examples include the Irish 
Hungarian Business Circle, the Norwegian Irish Business Association, and the 
Irish Business Club of Finland.  Whilst Scotland has specific offices in Brussels 
and other world centres, it also would have access to such networks through 
British diasporic ties between regions of migration and Britain.  
 
8.8 Global Knowledge Networks 
Global knowledge networks are transnational networks linking global regions with 
the homeland, including trade missions, business forums, philanthropy, 
mentoring, advice and access to decision makes.  In Scotland, the emphasis has 
been put on establishing an elite business network, Globalscot as part of a 
Global Connections Strategy.  Globalscot targets high achieving members of the 
Scottish Diaspora (almost 50% of the 840 Globalscot members operate at 
company Chairman, CEO or President level) who are specially selected and 
invited to join.  In Ireland, examples would include the Asia Pacific Business 
forum which links 11 Irish business groups in Asia Pacific and the Gulf to 
                                                 
31 The Irish Technology Leadership Group explicitly recognises the Indian and Chinese knowledge 
transfers from Silicon Valley which as Saxeninan has shown have been of importance to the development 
of the ICT sector in India and China  
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facilitate an exchange of ideas and resources and to leverage reputation and 
connections.  In addition, the Ireland Funds is a global philanthropic, but also 
business and social, network with 23 chapters spread across 10 countries, whilst 
the Irish Chamber of Commerce USA is a transnational economic network with 
13 chapters across the USA.   
 
8.9 Returnees  
As noted, Scotland and Ireland both have sizable overseas populations.  Both 
countries are seeking immigrants who have desirable skills and talents.  Both 
have only made marginal efforts to encourage their respective disapora to return 
to the home country to live permanently. Through the Scotland.org web site, the 
Fresh Talent Scheme, the work of the Relocation Advisory Agency Scotland, and 
TalentScotland, Scotland has put in place an infrastructure through which those 
who want to relocate can secure information and advice. Whilst returnee Scots 
have been only one of five priority groups for the Fresh Talent Initiative, and 
whilst to date arguably greatest attention has been given to attracting overseas 
students, it remains the case that the apparatus is available to all overseas 
Scots.  In addition, the organisation of the Homecoming Scotland 2009 event has 
resulted in a new prioritisation of the Scottish expatriate community. An important 
feature of Homecoming 2009 will be the capacity of agencies to translate holiday 
visits into longer term business, social, and cultural ties, and perhaps then to 
relocation.   
 
8.10 In the Irish case, proactive programmes were perhaps not needed given that the 
strength of the Irish economy and the lure of well paid jobs was enough to entice 
people back.  In general, Irish returnees were treated in the same fashion as 
other desirable skilled migrants.  For example, from the mid-1990s, the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment and FAS (the state training 
agency) organised a series of overseas trade fairs aimed at attracting talent to 
Ireland.  These fairs were mainly aimed at potential overseas immigrants, but 
also encouraged Irish diasporeans to consider returning home.  To aid those 
thinking of returning, the Department of Social and Family Affairs funded a 
number of organisations that provided advice to returnees.  For example, 
Emigrant Advice provides information through its ‘Returning to Ireland’ service on 
the statutory services and entitlements available to those ‘coming home’.  In 
addition, the Safe Home Programme was established to help vulnerable Irish 
abroad to return to live in Ireland and the Aisling Return to Ireland Project helps 
them visit on short-term holidays.   
 
8.11 Affinity diaspora  
Both Scotland and Ireland have attracted significant numbers of immigrants to 
live in their respective countries.  As a result, there are significant sized diaspora 
of other nation states residing in Scotland and Ireland.  These populations are 
clearly a target for other countries’ diaspora strategies, but they also represent a 
potential affinity diaspora for Scotland and Ireland.  Scotland has sought to 
develop this relationship through the Fresh Talent Scotland programme and the 
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Scottish Networks International programme.  Fresh Talent Scotland aims to 
attract skilled migrants to the higher education sector in Scotland and to 
encourage them to stay afterwards by offering favourable visa conditions that will 
enable them to work after their course has finished.  Scottish Networks 
International seeks to partner postgraduate students with Scottish companies for 
work placements.  By developing a relationship with the company it is hoped that 
if and when the student leaves Scotland they will help their partner company and 
other Scottish companies do business in their home country.  In effect they will 
continue to play for ‘Team Scotland’ when they leave.  Scottish Networks 
International is currently being restructured but its ethos is a valuable lesson for 
Ireland. In Ireland there has been little attempt to build an affinity diaspora 
although some Irish-Other Country business networks based in Ireland perform 
this function.  For example, the Ireland Turkey Business Association (ITBA) 
builds links between Turkish businesspeople in Ireland and Irish businesses and 
also helps Irish businesses seeking to do business in Turkey.  In this latter 
sense, the ITBA is playing for ‘Team Ireland’ overseas. Of course more 
generally, the international development work both states do in countries such 
as, among others, Malawi is part of the sowing of goodwill. 
  
8.12 Philanthropy 
There is a well developed network of philanthropic enterprises based in Scotland 
supporting Scottish society but the anecdotal evidence collected in the course of 
the research suggests that there is relatively little overseas Scottish philanthropy 
contributing to Scotland.  In contrast, Ireland has a very poorly developed 
indigenous philanthropic set-up, but has successfully cultivated philanthropy in 
the diaspora.  The Ireland Funds, International Fund for Ireland (IFI), and Atlantic 
Philanthropies (AP) are the prime examples.  Over the past thirty years, the 
Ireland Funds have raised more than €300m to be spent on projects in Ireland, 
IFI more than €850m and AP more than €500m.  It is hoped that with the newly 
generated wealth in Ireland (there are 33,000 cash millionaires in Ireland [not 
including the value of their main property]) that indigenous philanthropy will grow 
rapidly in the next 5 to 30 years.  The Ireland Funds are currently going through a 
period of introspection as the Peace Process in Northern Ireland and the 
economic success enjoyed by the Republic of Ireland has largely removed some 
of the rationale for expenditure in Ireland.  It is likely that the Ireland Funds will 
increasingly seek to position itself in terms of a number of global responsibilities 
and will channel donations to trouble spots and needy regions.  It is unclear what 
Scotland’s strategy for developing overseas philanthropy will be given the recent 
winding up of the Scotland Funds (mirrored on the Ireland Funds) but there is 
clearly a potential, untapped reservoir of financial goodwill that needs to be 
explored. 
 
8.13 Cultural and Social Building 
Both countries have cultural policies which pay due cognisance to the value of 
the diaspora as a generator and audience for Scottish and Irish culture.  In 
Scotland, as observed above, a raft of initiatives is now underway which will 
 38
contribute to building a heightened awareness of the country among its diaspora.  
Homecoming 2009, a year long tourist oriented ‘festival’ and hallmark event,  will 
be the flagship campaign in the near future and the challenge will be to harness 
the attachments to the country which will be generated during the year so as to 
secure a lasting legacy.  Scotland has perhaps more work to do to re-energise its 
diaspora which is commonly believed to be less engaged.  In contrast, Ireland’s 
challenge is to ensure that the historical affiliation which the diaspora has had to 
the country is maintained in achangin set of circumstances. Ireland already has 
an important set of media connections to the diaspora, not least through the 
popular weekly e-mail bulletin of the Irish Emigrant online which is sent to over 
30,000 addresses.  In addition, there is an interesting debate continuing as to 
how RTE, through its service charter, might cater for the diaspora including the 
use of a free to air Satellite Channel in the UK.    
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9. CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 
   
9.1 Diaspora strategies are built around five key pillars: firstly, a clear understanding 
of who belongs to the diaspora and which groups are being targeted for attention; 
secondly, a conscious appreciation of how and using what means states might 
best engage their diasporic populations; thirdly, an awareness of the histories 
and geographies of diasporas which produce different levels of desire and 
different competencies to connect with the homeland; fourthly, the social, 
cultural, economic, and demographic rationales which ought to guide and give 
purpose to specific kinds of intervention; and lastly, the range of innovative and 
effective concrete policy interventions available.  Any comparative analysis of 
Scotland and Ireland’s diaspora policies needs to take account of these five 
foundations.  Whilst inevitably simplifying a more nuanced and complex reality, 
this report has attempted to identify the key similarities and differences which 
exist between Scotland and Ireland in each case. 
9.2 In overall terms both Scotland and Ireland have no clear definition as to who 
might be part of their diaspora policies but do show a keen interest in widening 
the concept of diaspora and incorporating a range of overseas populations with 
an interest in playing for ‘Team Scotland’ and ‘Team Ireland’. Ireland’s approach 
to its diaspora thereafter takes the form of what might be referred to as a 
developmental state, lightly incubating initiatives which have emerged organically 
from an already existing diasporic community.  While the Irish state has placed a 
priority upon the provision of welfare from Ireland to vulnerable diasporic groups 
and to the preservation of strong social and cultural ties to Ireland, it also 
increasingly aspires to harness the diaspora to stimulate the country’s faltering 
knowledge economy. In contrast, the Scottish Government remains embedded 
within the British state and has a more narrowly defined and structured approach 
to engaging the Scottish diaspora, which in turns is believed to be less organised 
and primed. To date the Scottish approach would appear to be motivated by a 
number of demographic and economic concerns which are assumed to be 
contributing to an under-performing economy.  That said, reigniting the social and 
cultural attachment of the diaspora to Scotland is now being recognised as an 
emerging priority. Reflecting these conditions, both Scotland and Ireland 
undertake a range of concrete policy interventions, but place different emphases 
upon which interventions to adopt and how to implement them.    
9.3 Key questions for further reflection and debate 
This report has been written as an invitation to debate as to how Scotland might 
progress towards a diaspora strategy.  We have noted that the term ‘strategy’ is 
best used loosely in this context, to refer to firstly the securing of an overview of 
the range of actual and potential public, private, and voluntary ties between 
diasporic groups and Scotland,  and secondly to a preferred orientation as to how 
these ties might best be developed. It need not imply, and may not be best 
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served by, a coherent and formalised top down, bureaucratically regulated, and 
managerialist, blueprint.   As such, our intention has not been to produce a set of 
firm recommendations. Nevertheless a number of key questions emerge and by 
way of conclusion it is worthwhile drawing attention to them.  
9.4 Which populations constitute the Scottish diaspora and should be included as 
part of a targeted diaspora strategy? 
 For pragmatic and political reasons there is an urgent need to define and 
delineate the range of constituencies which might constitute the Scottish 
diaspora. There is merit in widening the definition of diaspora to include as many 
constituencies who might be prepared to play for ‘Team Scotland’ as possible. 
This widening might include expatriates irrespective of the grounds for their 
departure, later day descendants with a sense of heritage, mobile Scots and 
business travellers leading a transnational existence, and other nationalities both 
resident in Scotland and elsewhere with an affinity towards the country. 
9.5 What government structures and programmes are best suited to the 
establishment of new relations with diasporic populations? 
The Irish approach to diaspora is relatively successful, particularly with respect to 
business, because it is light and flexible in structure, gives ownership and 
freedom to its members, and is developmental without being muscular.  The 
state’s role is to nurture and incubate, not manage and over-determine.  The 
state has also recognized its role in supporting vulnerable Irish abroad and in 
fostering Irish-mindedness as prerequisite for creating a sustainable relationship 
with its diaspora.  Scotland, in contrast, has pursued a strategy that is more 
muscular, state-centric and centrally managed.  If it is true to say that the 
Scottish diaspora is less well articulated and organised, then there might be good 
reason for this. Moreover, the Scottish approach has clearly delivered a number 
of impressive schemes, in particular the much heralded GlobalScot network. This 
said, we believe that the Scottish Government might usefully reflect on the 
position and role of the state in managing diaspora initiatives, conduct research 
into already existing diaspora networks and consider complimenting existing 
state run schemes by seeding, serving as midwife and performing a husbandary 
role for wider social and economic networks amongst the Scottish diaspora.  The 
metrics through which schemes are evaluated and judged to have succeeded or 
failed should also be considered.  Public accountability, transparency, and 
auditability are crucial for the legitimacy of schemes but diaspora initiatives often 
require sustained and long term investment before they bear fruits and these 
fruits are often intangible and unquantifiable but undeniably beneficial.  As such 
public administration of diaspora schemes should consider creating a specific set 
of measurable deliverables suitable to the task and timeframe at hand.   
9.6 How are diaspora organized and how does their underlying structure and logic 
predispose them to engage in different ways with the home nation? 
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The Scottish diaspora is almost as expansive and large as the Irish diaspora and 
is a huge and relatively untapped resource for Scotland. Nevertheless, as a 
consequence of the historical formation of the diaspora, and in particular the 
voluntary nature of much of the emigration and speed of assimilation into the new 
communities, it is widely believed that it is not as well organized or culturally 
ready to be engaged.  Fundamental to the building of a Scottish diaspora 
strategy must be a renewed interest in fortifying and stimulating Scottish 
patriotism and Scottish-mindedness in the diaspora.  This must come before all 
other forms of engagement and is a prerequisite for success.  The nature of 
these cultural foundations also needs reflection and certainly has to move 
beyond stereotypical tropes of clan, tartan, whiskey, bagpipes, Burns and golf to 
engage with the full diversity of the Scottish diaspora.  It is clear that a critical 
mass of high profile culture building projects are now underway and these will 
surely make a significant contribution to the building of the diaspora. 
Nevertheless.  a full and open debate is required as to the extent to which 
Scottish Independence will be required if Scotland is to expect its diaspora to be 
as lively and vibrant as Ireland or whether the diaspora can be enlivened within 
the existing constitutional arrangements.  
9.7 What social, economic, and demographic objectives ought to underpin the 
engagement with diasporic populations? 
Scotland has different social, cultural, and economic needs from Ireland and has 
a different set of rationales for engaging with its diaspora. Return migration to 
meet population growth targets, the establishment of global economic networks 
to broker the globalization of Scottish firms and the localization of TNCs in 
Scotland, as well as the cultural nurturing of the Scottish diaspora are all key and 
pressing priorities. In addition, many countries are viewing their diaspora as a 
primed resource waiting to be exploited for economic gain.  We feel that this view 
will deliver short-term gains but will potentially fail over the long term.  People will 
quickly tire of a relationship that is unidirectional and any scheme has to be 
structured in such a way that the diaspora gains as much out of the relationship 
as Scotland.  From this perspective, the diaspora becomes a precious resource 
to be cared for and tended, valued and re-energised, so that Scotland grows in 
partnership with its diaspora.  
9.8 What concrete policies and interventions are current being introduced and what 
innovations merit closer scrutiny? 
Scottish policy makers should look in particular at the possibilities of reworking 
the following Irish schemes into a Scottish diaspora strategy. 
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Irish Abroad Unit 
Emigrant Advice Network 
Enterprise Ireland’s approach to building business and social networks  
Emigrant News Online 
Ireland Funds 
 
9.9 And they should consider building a larger version of Scottish Networks 
International and help to nurture (though not own and run) ventures such as 
Scots in London network. 
 
9.10 Ireland should in turn study and draw lessons from : 
Globalscot 
Scottish Network International 
Fresh Talent Initiative which includes Relocation Advisory Service  
Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies  
Scotland.org Web portal 
Homecoming Scotland 2009 campaign 
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10  SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS 
 
10.1 Scotland and Ireland have much to learn from each other with regards to how 
they conceive and develop their relationship with their respective diasporas.  This 
report has documented the various schemes and policies that operate in both 
countries and outlined the prospective ways that relationships with diaspora can 
be usefully forged.  Our intention has been to provide an initial starting point for 
further reflection and dialogue by presenting an empirically-informed platform 
upon which a more widely conceived diaspora strategy for Scotland can be 
debated and built.  Our view is that any strategy for Scotland should: 
 
• seek to focus on the cultural as well as economic;  
• be light in touch and flexible where appropriate rather than heavily structured and 
over-determined;  
• be formulated to work over the long term;  
• have an open view of who constitutes the diaspora and the value of an affinity 
diaspora;  
• recognize that the intangible benefits of a strategy will be as important as 
tangible ones; 
• understand that the relationship with the diaspora has to be reciprocal for it to be 
sustainable.   
 
10.2 The Scottish diaspora represents a huge potential resource for Scotland and 
Scotland offers the diaspora many benefits, the key to both parties success is 
to grow that relationship in partnership with each other.  In order to progress such 
a partnership we believe that further steps are required to map out what a 
re-envisioned Scottish diaspora strategy might look like.  These steps are: 
 
1.  Research and formulation of potential schemes and ways forward.  This report is 
part of that process, but further research is required including an in-depth study 
of best practice in countries other than Ireland. 
 
2. Consultation with Scottish diaspora organizations and affinity Scots, Scottish 
Government units and agencies, and global agencies such as the World Bank 
and UNESCO who have aided a number of countries formulate their strategies. 
 
3. The formulation of a draft, overarching diaspora strategy that sets out its basic 
principles, including full details on suggested schemes, their remit and operation. 
 
4. An open debate on the proposed diaspora strategy as a mechanism to refine the 
path towards creating a fruitful partnership between Scotland, its diaspora and its 
affinity diaspora. 
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Scotland 
  
Government 
UK’s Department of Foreign Affairs/Foreign and Commonwealth Office: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/ 
 
Scottish Enterprise: http://www.scottish-enterprise.com/ 
 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise: http://www.hie.co.uk/ 
 
Fresh Talent Initiative: http://www.scotlandistheplace.com/ 
 
Global Scot: https://www.globalscot.com/public/index.aspx 
 
Scottish Network International: http://www.scottishni.org/ 
 
Global Friends of Scotland: http://www.friendsofscotland.gov.uk/ 
 
Homecoming Scotland 2009: http://www.homecomingscotland.com/ 
 
Event Scotland: http://www.eventscotland.org/ 
 
Visit Scotland: http://www.visitscotland.com/ 
 
Scottish business and social networking 
ScotsIn: http://www.scotsin.com/ 
 
US Scots: http://www.usscots.com/ 
 
Philanthropy 
Scotland Funds: http://www.thescotlandfunds.org.uk/ 
 
American-Scottish Foundation: http://www.americanscottishfoundation.com 
 
 
Ireland 
 
Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs: http://www.dfa.ie 
 
Irish Abroad Unit: http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=291 
 
Enterprise Ireland: http://www.enterprise-ireland.com/ 
 
Department of Social and Family Affairs: http://www.welfare.ie/  
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Department of Education and Science: http://www.education.ie/ 
 
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government: http://www.environ.ie/ 
 
Culture Ireland: http://www.cultureireland.gov.ie/ 
 
Tourism Ireland: http:// www.tourismireland.com/ 
 
Voluntary-sector support for Irish overseas 
Irish Council for Prisoners Overseas: http://www.catholicbishops.ie/prisoners-overseas 
 
Crosscare Migrant Project: http://www.migrantproject.ie/ 
 
Irish returning home 
Emigrant Advice Network: http://www.ean.ie/ 
 
Emigrant Advice: http://www.migrantproject.ie/publications.htm 
 
Citizens Advice concerning returning to Ireland 
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/categories/moving-country/moving-to-ireland/coming-
to-live-in-ireland/irish-citizens-coming-or-returning-to-ireland 
 
IrishAbroad.com returning home advice  
http://www.irishabroad.com/Irish-World/Expats/Moving-to-Ireland/ 
 
Safe Home Programme: http://www.safehomeireland.com/links.htm 
 
Aisling Return To Ireland Project: http://www.aisling.org.uk/drupal/index.php 
 
Irish business and social networking 
IrishAbroad.com: http://www.irishabroad.com/Home/Default.aspx 
 
European Irish: http://www.europeanirish.com/index.php 
 
Irish Technology Leadership Group – Silicon Valley: http://www.itlg.org/ 
 
Biolink USA-Ireland: http://www.biolinkusaireland.org/ 
 
Techlink UK-Ireland: 
http://www.biotechnologyireland.com/pooled/profiles/BF_COMP/view.asp?Q=BF_COM
P_23951 
 
IBEC – Irish Business and Employers Confederation: http://www.ibec.ie 
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News services for Irish Abroad 
The Irish Emigrant: http://www.emigrant.ie/ 
 
Irish Voice: http://www.irishvoice.com/ 
 
RTÉ: http:// www.rte.ie/ 
 
Immigration services 
The Irish Lobby for Immigration Reform (ILIR): http://www.irishlobbyusa.org/ 
 
Irish Immigration Centre: http://www.iicenter.org/index.html 
 
Philanthropy 
Ireland Funds: http://www.irlfunds.org/ 
 
International Fund for Ireland: http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/ 
 
Atlantic Philanthropies: http://atlanticphilanthropies.org/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50
APPENDIX 1: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AS PART OF THE RESEARCH  
 
Scotland 
Irene Johnstone, Director, Scottish Enterprise and International Networks 
Ben Guthrie, British Council Coordinator, Scottish Networks International  
Dick Mungin, Former Chief Executive Officer, Scotland funds  
Ruth Steel, Global Friends of Scotland     
Ian Kernohan, Scottish Government  
Joanne Deponio, Homecoming Scotland, Event Scotland  
Denise Hill, Director, Visit Scotland  
Luke Cavanagh, Scottish Government, Analytical Services 
 
Ireland 
Kingley Aikens, Chairperson, Ireland Funds 
Ray Bassett, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs 
Noreen Bowden, Director, Emigrant Advice Network 
Jim Carroll, Irish Abroad Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs 
Goan Cathal, Director-General, RTE 
Liam Ferrie, Emigrant News 
Conor Fahy, Regional Director, Southern Europe, Middle East and Africa, Enterprise 
Ireland 
Gerry Murphy, Director, International Sales & Partnering, Enterprise Ireland 
Tim O’Connor, Secretary General, President’s Office 
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